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Abstract 
This paper addresses the question of what role morally oriented behavior plays in the 
efficiency of market outcomes. This issue is as controversial in economics as it is in 
sociology. To get a better understanding of the problems and opportunities involved 
in morally oriented behavior in markets, I develop a typology that distinguishes four 
different forms of morality-based behavior and try to understand what consequences 
derive from these types of morally motivated action. The four forms I discuss I 
call “cooperation,” “group solidarity,” “blocked exchange” and “altruism.” There is a 
fifth – parasitic – type that I call “Trojan altruism.” I argue that the contested role of 
morality is rooted in the profoundly ambivalent consequences that morality has on 
market efficiency. 
Zusammenfassung 
In diesem Discussion Paper betrachte ich die Auswirkungen moralisch orientierten 
Handelns auf die Effizienz von Märkten. Diese Frage ist sowohl unter Soziologen als 
auch unter Ökonomen stark umstritten. Um zu einem besseren Verständnis der Pro-
bleme und Chancen zu gelangen, die sich aus moralischen Handlungsorientierungen 
für Marktbeziehungen ergeben, entwickele ich eine Typologie, mit der vier verschie-
dene Formen moralgestützten Handelns unterschieden werden. Die vier Formen 
nenne ich „Kooperation“, „Gruppensolidarität“, „blockierter Tausch“ und „Altruis-
mus“. Darüber hinaus besteht ein fünfter, parasitärer Typus, den ich als „Trojani-
schen Altruismus“ bezeichne. Ich zeige, dass die umstrittene Rolle von Moralität für 
Märkte ihren Hintergrund in den tatsächlich zutiefst ambivalenten Folgen von Mora-
lität für die Effizienz von Märkten hat. 
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Introduction 
What role does morality play for market outcomes? For most sociologists the func-
tioning of markets is closely connected to the moral conduct of economic actors. This 
position is expressed, for instance, by the French sociologist Émile Durkheim (1984) 
who argued that purely self-interested behavior cannot produce stable exchange rela-
tions. Only through the “non contractual conditions of contract” do actors feel effec-
tively bound to the contractual obligations they have agreed to. The moral code stops 
actors from exploiting their exchange partners through opportunistic behavior. This 
way morality supports the functioning of markets by reducing transaction costs. An-
other sociological classic, Max Weber (1984), made morality a cornerstone in his ex-
planation of macroeconomic development: For him the emergence of modern west-
ern capitalism had an indispensable basis in the moral doctrines of Protestantism. 
Wolfgang Streeck (1997: 198) followed this idea by introducing the notion of “benefi-
cial constraints,” meaning that the performance of an economy “may be improved by 
the surrounding society retaining and exercising a right for itself to interfere with the 
choice and pursuit of individual preferences.” 
However, the conviction that markets need a moral basis has not gone undisputed in 
sociology (Luhmann 1986, 1988). But more than sociologists, economists have chal-
lenged this position. Most famously the model of the “invisible hand” expresses the 
connection of public virtue to private vices and thereby disconnects market outcomes 
from morally motivated action.  
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our din-
ner but from their regard to their self-interest. (Smith 1976: 18)1  
A famous contemporary expression of the unwanted consequences of morally moti-
vated behavior in markets is Milton Friedman’s (1973) dictum that “the social re-
sponsibility of business is to make profits.” According to Friedman, any deviation 
from profit maximization is itself morally problematic since the moral task of eco-
nomic actors is to maximize economic welfare. 
While economists standing in the neo-classical tradition see moral action orientations 
as blocking economically efficient outcomes, economists from other theoretical tradi-
tions presume that the logic of self-interest must be moderated by morality in order to 
allow for the “common good” or even for the functioning of markets itself. The insti-
tutionalist tradition, and also the new microeconomics, see norms, values and trust as 
                                                        
1 This reading of Adam Smith reflects the interpretation of his work by proponents of the neo-
classical tradition in economics. Smith scholars have argued pervasively that this is a flawed 
interpretation of the Scottish enlightenment philosopher (Wight: 2002). The purpose here, 
however, is to present an analytical position that plays an important role in economic think-
ing. 
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indispensable elements of the functioning of markets (Arrow 1973). There are situa-
tions where selfishness should be held back by moral principles to achieve superior 
outcomes. The reason is that markets themselves are “morally unreliable” (Offe 1989). 
Morality is certainly not the only mechanism by which market failure can be cor-
rected. Morality does play, however, an important role for overcoming free-riding and 
for solving principal-agent problems. 
These brief remarks give an impression on the essentially contested role of morality 
for market outcomes. The conflict is not one that separates academic disciplines; it 
runs through disciplinary lines. My intention in this paper is to critically examine 
these positions: Does morality hinder economic efficiency or is morality a necessary 
condition for markets to operate? Which problems exactly can be resolved through 
morally motivated behavior? And which limitations to economic efficiency are caused 
by morality?2 
The question of the effects of morality on markets is not only of academic interest. It 
is also from the background of recent corporate scandals that morality in business – 
or the lack thereof – has become a pressing issue in public debate. Have corporate 
managers become more selfish? What institutional or moral safeguards are needed to 
prevent the excesses that brought companies like Enron and Worldcom to bank-
ruptcy? 
What I will argue in this paper is that the contested role of morality has its causes in 
the indeed profoundly ambivalent consequences that morality has on market out-
comes. Morality allows for the emergence and stabilization of market exchange, but it 
is also an action orientation that can block exchange relations that are economically 
beneficial. I intend to contribute to a better understanding of this ambivalence by 
introducing a taxonomy that distinguishes four different forms of morality-based 
                                                        
2 In focusing on the economic effects of morality on market outcomes, I will not deal with three 
other questions related to morality in the economy. First, I will not discuss the question of the 
consequences for economic theory that derive from the inclusion of morality. Amartya Sen 
(1977), among others, has shown that morally motivated behavior demands profound 
changes of neoclassic economic models since it involves “in a very real sense, counterpreferen-
tial choice, destroying the crucial assumption that a chosen alternative must be better than (or 
at least as good as) the others for the person choosing it” (Sen 1977: 33). The notion of meta-
preferences is one well known suggestion to include morality into economic theory (Sen 1977; 
Hirschman 1986; Etzioni 1988). Secondly, I will deal only marginally with the question of 
non-economic justifications for “moral systems of exchange” (Biggart/Delbridge 2004). Eco-
nomic efficiency cannot provide by itself justification for certain behaviors or institutional 
regulations. To submerge normative questions under the logic of efficiency would be a cate-
gorical mistake. A third question connected to the issue of morality and markets that is not 
dealt with here refers to the relationship of morality and institutions.  What institutional sup-
port do actors need in order to make it more likely that they will actually act in accordance 
with the moral convictions they hold (Hirschman 1986; Offe 1989)? 
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behavior and try to understand what consequences derive from these types of morally 
motivated action. The four forms I will discuss I call “cooperation,” “group solidar-
ity,” “blocked exchange” and “altruism.” There is a fifth – parasitic – type that I will 
call “Trojan altruism.”  
By morality I mean that actors act in accordance with some principle which is ori-
ented (also) toward the well-being of others or the common good and is followed 
even if it demands to forgo additional personal profit or utility. Amartya Sen (1977) 
has called this action orientation “commitment.” With reference to the terminology 
introduced by Robert Frank (1990), one can formulate: to act morally, an actor must 
be willing to engage in “irrational behavior without regret.” “Irrational behavior” re-
fers to decisions that deviate from individual utility maximization. The “lack of re-
gret” implies that the behavior was chosen not simply by miscalculation of outcomes 
but by a deliberate choice. 
My argument is not that the observation of inefficiencies due to moral orientations of 
actors gives justifications to change these expressions of value rationality. Instead the 
argument is that economies operate within the context of a moral universe that resists 
the logic of economic efficiency and that at times this resistance is itself a precondition 
for market exchange, while at others it produces inefficiencies. 
A typology of moral behavior in market exchange 
Morality can enter into market exchange in four different forms. It can enter by taking 
one’s own well-being and the well-being of others into consideration. This I will call 
“cooperation.” An important special case of cooperation will be discussed under the 
heading of “group solidarity.” The third typological form in which morality can enter 
into market exchange is by an action orientation that is entirely non-consequentialist, 
i.e. which disregards the welfare effects for ego and alter-ego. This comes closest to 
Weber’s (1985) notion of value rationality. I will refer to this as “blocked exchange” 
(Walzer 1983). Morality can also enter the decision-making process in the typological 
form of ignoring consequences for one’s own well-being but having the well-being of 
others in mind. This I will call “altruism.” Finally, the last form is a parasitic way for 
morality to enter a decision-making situation. It indicates an action that appears to be 
beneficial to others but is in fact primarily advantageous to the actor himself. This 
behavior, which is actually immoral, I will call “Trojan altruism.” 
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Cooperation 
By cooperation I refer to a set of reciprocal promises and expectations that guide ex-
change relationships in a mutually beneficial way. Such promises and expectations can 
become effective through an intersubjectively shared moral code that binds the behav-
ior of the parties to the exchange. Based on this moral code, market participants will 
fulfill their contractual obligations even if it would be advantageous for them not to 
do so. They will also disclose relevant information accurately.3 Morality in “coopera-
tion” can contribute to the solution of prisoner-dilemma situations and principal-
agent problems.4 In the prisoner dilemma, all players will achieve a superior outcome 
if they cooperate. Effective ethical codes can help to induce cooperative behavior and 
thereby contribute to resolve endemic free-rider problems (Arrow 1973; Beckert 
2002a). The significance of morality in principal-agent situations is no less important. 
It has already been described by Max Weber (1984) in his treatment of the role of 
Protestant sects in American business life. Weber observed that sect members are 
trusted in business relations disembedded from the local community due to an effec-
tive ethical code that will bind the behavior of the sect member even when conducting 
business with complete strangers. Hence the ethical code allows actors to engage in 
                                                        
3 An increasingly relevant counter-example is fake medication. Particularly in Third World 
countries, patients are increasingly confronted with bogus medications that either contain no 
active ingredients or even include substances that are poisonous. Pharmaceutical companies 
are not only worried about this tendency because it effects their business through a loss in 
short term sales, but also because it can lead to market failure due to a loss in customer confi-
dence in the effectiveness of medications.  
4 Granovetter (1985) has made an important point that the effectiveness of behavioral norms 
depends not only on value convictions, but especially on the concrete structures of social rela-
tions. 
Table 1 Typology of moral action in market exchange
 Ego 
 Non-beneficial Beneficial 
Non-beneficial 
Blocked exchanges (Trojan altruism) 
Alter ego 
Beneficial Altruism Cooperation 
Group 
solidarity 
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mutually beneficial transactions that are otherwise considered too risky and would 
not take place. Both parties in the exchange profit. In other words, morality can help 
to prevent market failure and thereby increases the efficiency of the system. 
Prisoner dilemma situations and principal-agent problems both show little ambiva-
lence with regard to the consequences of commitment-guided behavior for market 
outcomes – morality has almost exclusively positive effects. If the logic described by 
George Akerlof (1970) for the used car market holds true, then not only the principal 
(the buyer of the car) is better off if he or she can rely on the accuracy and complete-
ness of the information revealed, but also the agent himself is better off. Otherwise the 
market would fail to come into existence or more costly monitoring devices would 
need to be introduced. The same holds true for labor relations where a lack of any 
other motives besides personal gain will have negative effects for productivity (Akerlof 
1984). A similar argument can be made with regard to professional ethics that are a 
coordinating force in the exchange relations between laypeople and expert systems.5 
Group solidarity 
A closely related type of morally guided behavior affecting markets is “group solidar-
ity.” It is based on the pooling of resources. Group solidarity differs from “coopera-
tion” by drawing a boundary between those actors covered by the moral obligations 
and those not covered by these obligations. Through this boundary of exclusion – or 
network closure (Coleman 1990) – group solidarity achieves an ambivalent status as 
the moral principles are only coordinating behavior within the group. Behavior can be 
non-moralistic, purely self-interested with regard to the consequences of decisions for 
outsiders. Solidarity is a non-universalistic ethic (Bayertz 1998). 
Looking at social relations within the group, “group solidarity” has characteristics 
similar to “cooperation.” It is a mechanism for improvement of one’s own situation 
and that of other group members by overcoming free-riding. Solving free-rider prob-
lems is a precondition for the effective pooling of resources. In modern capitalist 
                                                        
5 The only ambiguity arising in the prisoner dilemma and in principal-agent situations is with 
regard to the trust-taker or agent. Particularly when the behavior of the agent cannot be com-
pletely observed by the principals, it might be a more profitable strategy for him or her to al-
ternate between moral (cooperation) and immoral (defection) strategies. Such mixed strate-
gies do not necessarily lead to market failure, in part, because the exchange partner does not 
have the information to know which strategy the agent actually follows. As experimental stud-
ies in game theory show, there are other strategies besides unconditional cooperation that 
have superior pay-offs for the trust-taker (agent) compared to unconditional cooperation. For 
the agent it may be sufficient to act partially morally to earn the full benefits of morality. Ho-
wever, this behavior would not be covered by the notion of morality applied in this paper ac-
cording to which moral behavior reflects counter-preferential choices. 
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economies the union movement is probably the most relevant empirical form of 
group solidarity. Unions enhance the workers’ power positions in the industrial con-
flict by credibly threatening to withdraw a significant amount of labor from the pro-
duction process that cannot be substituted for in the short run. Unions do have the 
instrumental goals of negotiating better wage settlements, working conditions or 
greater job security. However, as Claus Offe and Helmut Wiesenthal (1985) have 
shown, membership mobilization by unions cannot rely exclusively on rational in-
strumental motivations, but it must also appeal to a moral obligation to participate, 
even if unions want to serve nothing “but the member’s individual utilitarian inter-
ests” (Offe/Wiesenthal 1985: 183). 
Commitment-based behavior leading to the pooling of resources can have positive 
consequences for the instrumental goals of the group members. Its role in market effi-
ciency, however, is highly contested. From a market-liberal perspective union solidar-
ity amounts to a cartel that increases prices for labor and thereby leads to inefficient 
equilibria. Based on this claim, unions are seen as being responsible for unemploy-
ment. This argument, however, does not go unchallenged. According to institutional-
ist approaches in economics (and sociology), unions do play a constructive role in 
markets and general economic welfare by helping to institutionalize industrial con-
flict, forcing companies to invest into their competitiveness and increasing consumer 
purchasing power (e.g. Streeck/Schmitter 1985). 
The positive role of group solidarity has also been demonstrated in research on ethnic 
economies (Portes/Sensenbrenner 1993). Here network closure can help overcome 
market failures that arise through discrimination. This can be exemplified by ethnic 
economies in the U.S. In order to be able to start a company, some immigrant groups, 
who do not have access to American capital markets, come together in rotating credit 
associations, pooling their assets and using them in turn to finance their individual 
businesses. This makes it possible to create firms, which otherwise would not have 
been established. Though these associations rely on intense reciprocal monitoring of 
its members, they are also based on the moral implications of belonging to the same 
ethnic group.6 At the same time, non-members of the ethnic group are excluded from 
the benefits and thereby discriminated against through ascriptive criteria. This shows 
the purely self-interested side of group solidarity with regard to non-members. 
Community or family based network closure is, however, by no means unequivocally 
positive for the economic well-being of the members of the solidaristic community. If 
moral codes demand that economically successful family (or community) members 
support less successful members by transferring resources, these resources are not 
available for individual business investments. As observed by anthropologists, this can 
inhibit economic development and gives rise to avoidance strategies by which success-
                                                        
6 The closure of the community was also a precondition for effective monitoring.  
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ful entrepreneurs try to circumvent family obligations. One interesting strategy has 
been observed in indigenous villages in Ecuador. Male owners of garment and leather 
artisan shops convert to Protestantism. By doing so the entrepreneurs “remove them-
selves from the host of social obligations for male family heads associated with the 
Catholic Church and its local organization” (Portes/Sensenbrenner 1993: 1339). In 
more general terms, this supports Max Weber’s claim that one of the chief causes for 
the success of modern Western capitalism was that Protestantism guided economic 
exchange away from the close connectedness of economic affairs to social obligations. 
Weber (1986) alluded also to a further problematic consequence of distinguishing 
between a morality within the group and an external morality that is characterized by 
pure utilitarianism. He found this type of particularism in societies adhering to Con-
fucianism and saw in it the reason for general mistrust becoming a dominant feature 
in all business relations reaching beyond the group’s boundaries. Not morality as such 
but a morality that is only valid for the family and the clan was a factor that prevented 
the development of extensive exchange relations. 
Blocked exchange 
The third type of morally guided behavior in markets I will call – using a term intro-
duced by Michael Walzer (1983) – “blocked exchange.” Blocked exchange refers to 
the prohibition or restriction of the monetary exchange of certain objects or services 
based on moral codes. It is the opposite of cooperation where the function of morality 
is to enable market transactions. Blocked exchanges prevent the market exchange of 
certain goods and services by keeping them outside the market realm.7 
Which transactions are blocked changes historically and differs between societies. 
Therefore it is not possible to make a finite list of goods and services to which ex-
change restrictions apply. Two economically crucial fields where such changes have 
occurred are the limitations of charging interest for lending money and the abolition 
of slavery. Cultural differences can be seen in religiously motivated taboos on the con-
sumption of certain food products like pork. 
Despite historical and social variance it is possible to list categories of goods that are 
likely to be restricted from monetary exchange in modern societies. One category are 
exchanges that affect the human body. It is prohibited to buy another person (slavery 
                                                        
7 Societies may succeed only incompletely in the enforcement of such blockages. This does not, 
however, invalidate the claim that certain exchanges are morally rejected and that subsequent 
restrictions do have effects on the way these goods and services are exchanged.  
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and adoption).8 The commercial sale of body parts for medical reasons is mostly for-
bidden (organ markets); in many countries women are prohibited from carrying a 
child to term for another, infertile woman (reproductive medicine); and the sale of 
sexual services is restricted and even prohibited in many countries (prostitution). A 
second realm is the market exchange of political influence and offices. The purchase 
of political decisions is called corruption and as such illegal. The third realm are legal 
claims and obligations that cannot be purchased or sold. There is no market for trad-
ing criminal punishment. The rights to vote, to freedom of expression or to freely 
exercise one’s religious beliefs are all non-marketable.9 
In general terms, blocked exchanges are characterized by the separation of the goods 
or services that are connected to “sacred” (Durkheim) social values from the “pro-
fane” sphere of the market. It is not instrumental rationality that motivates exchange 
blockages but rather value rationality (Weber), i.e., the belief in the value of an action 
independent of its consequences for oneself or for others. As Durkheim has argued, 
the act of establishing such taboos is an important aspect of the identity of a social 
group. This implies that blocked exchanges cannot be explained by their contribution 
to economic efficiency. The idea that political decisions and human beings cannot be 
bought might have positive economic consequences. Nevertheless, the justification for 
prohibiting corruption or abolishing slavery is not based on an economic rationale 
but rooted in social values which discredit corruption and slavery on moral grounds. 
Even if norms cannot be explained functionally, it is possible to ask for economic con-
sequences of restrictions on specific exchanges since they do not have merely moral 
relevance, but have functional consequences for the economic system as well. Accord-
ing to Max Weber’s theory of rationalization the (originally religiously motivated) 
decoupling of exchange from moral obligations was one of the crucial preconditions 
for the development of a modern, functionally differentiated economy. The dissolu-
tion of religious restrictions on money lending, the decoupling of exchange from par-
ticularistic privileges and the development of modern labor markets were among the 
most important developments in this process. A case for positive economic effects 
stimulated by the decoupling of economic exchange from moral restrictions has been 
analyzed by Viviana Zelizer (1979) in her research on the development of the life in-
surance industry in nineteenth-century America. This industry was originally blocked 
by moral objections, primarily expressed by women, who refused to receive a “pre-
mium” for their husband’s death. For many years this moral conviction blocked the 
development of an effective financial instrument for the economic protection of wid-
ows. 
                                                        
8 Labor markets have the characteristic that not the person itself is bought but rather his or her 
labor power. 
9 A much more complete list of blocked exchanges is provided in Walzer (1983). 
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It is not possible here to show the consequences of blocked exchanges in detail. This 
would demand a close discussion of each morally motivated restriction on market 
exchange. What I want to illustrate briefly, however, is that the economic effects of 
blocked exchanges show profound ambivalences with regard to individual welfare and 
macroeconomic efficiency. While the aforementioned examples point to negative 
economic consequences, examples for positive economic effects from restrictions of 
market exchange come easily to mind. Such effects can be attributed to the blockage 
of the purchasing of political decisions, as can be seen from the examples in corrup-
tion-ridden countries. Also, the restrictions on the use of labor power – for instance 
the prohibition of child labor – have positive economic implications regarding the 
future productivity of children. 
One complication with regard to welfare effects derives from the following paradoxi-
cal effect that has been observed in the market for blood (Titmuss 1971). The blood 
market – and possibly other markets for goods taken from the human body as well – 
has an untypical supply curve. The introduction of an exchange market for blood does 
not leave the supply of voluntary blood donations unaffected; where blood supply 
becomes a commercial activity, donors feel less responsibility to continue donating it. 
Hence, monetary compensation leads to a reduction in voluntary supply. This result, 
which contradicts economic reasoning, cites economic reasons for organizing blood 
donations as a gift. 
Finally, the prohibition of markets for moral reasons might have unintended side ef-
fects that must be examined. One important aspect is that the prevention of markets 
gives way to the emergence of illegal markets that have consequences usually seen as 
socially and individually negative. Such markets emerge when not all actors submit to 
the morally demanded behavior. This can be observed not only in the case of (illegal) 
markets for organs. The prohibition of prostitution undermines the protection of 
illegal sex industry workers and makes them especially vulnerable; the prohibition of 
certain narcotics leads to the emergence of drug dealers, crime and serious problems 
for public health. Through these effects, the morally motivated prohibition of markets 
shows profound moral and economic dilemmas. 
Altruism 
The fourth type of morally motivated behavior relevant for markets is “altruism.” 
Altruism is defined by a voluntary self-commitment to behavior based on value that 
inflicts costs on oneself for the benefit of others. Altruism has several forms. The most 
economically significant one is the voluntary inclusion of otherwise externalized costs. 
This is the core arena of business ethics, fair trade and socially conscientious con-
sumer choices. If companies voluntarily abstain from hiring child labor, pay living 
wages and protect the natural environment in which they operate their plants, they 
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increase their costs (i.e., their shareholder’s or customer’s costs) for the benefit of 
stakeholders like their employees and neighborhood communities. By now, voluntary 
codes of conduct have led to the establishment of an international standard on social 
accountability (SA 8000). Some large retailers purchase only from manufacturers that 
comply with the SA 8000 standard (Biggart/Delbridge 2004). This can be seen as an 
indicator for an increasing “moralization of markets.” 
It is, however, debatable to what extent compliance with standards of social or envi-
ronmental accountability does indeed reflect altruism. Companies might simply at-
tempt to avoid conflicts with important stakeholders by complying with social ac-
countability standards or create an image as socially conscientious businesses as an 
effective argument in their marketing strategies. If profit strategies motivate the com-
pliance of companies to standards of social and environmental accountability, their 
behavior is not covered by the notion of altruism. While the significance of altruism 
in business behavior is ultimately an empirical question, two theoretical points can be 
made. First, the market mechanism limits the possibility of altruistic choices that can-
not be turned into increased revenues. Managers in a market economy are structurally 
forced to orient their decisions towards profit making. Any other behavior will lead to 
a loss in profits and a reduction in market share. Second, the role of the market 
mechanism does not imply that decisions are determined by the market. Most organi-
zations do have significant slack that allows for inefficient decisions without jeopard-
izing the survival of the company. Moreover, if one assumes that, under conditions of 
complexity and fundamental uncertainty of outcomes, managers cannot identify op-
timal strategies, the perspective of market determination of business decisions is 
flawed. Under such conditions managers will base their decisions on culturally legiti-
mated conceptualizations of rationality. This constitutive role of culture allows for the 
introduction of ethically motivated decisions into firm behavior despite market pres-
sures towards efficiency (Beckert 2002b). 
Regardless of whether it reflects genuine altruism or not, the addition of moral con-
siderations into the market does change the way business is conducted. Pressure to 
find ethically reflective strategies develops mostly as a result of investor and consumer 
choices. Investment fund managers might invest only in companies that have progres-
sive policies towards gays and lesbians or that comply with standards of social ac-
countability. An interesting example is also the rising field of Islamic banking. Here 
investments are only made to companies that comply with “Islamic values” (Biggart/
Delbridge 2004: 39). This is a form of altruism on the investor’s side if the investor 
must assume that his investment will have a lower return because he or she forgoes 
more lucrative alternative investment opportunities. Consumers show altruistic action 
orientations, for instance, by buying more expensive goods from a neighborhood 
store, instead of purchasing from Wal-Mart, because they believe in the value of hav-
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ing neighborhood stores. Consumer boycotts on the other hand express condemna-
tion of certain business practices by consumers. Consumers are willing to avoid a 
product or store in order to support practices that comply with their values.10 
But what are the economic consequences of such altruistic, value directed allocations 
of capital and consumer purchasing power? They are costly for the investor or the 
consumer in monetary terms. One pays a higher price for bread in the local grocery 
store compared to purchasing it from Wal-Mart. One does without apples from South 
Africa if they are produced under Apartheid conditions, even if they are a better eco-
nomic value. One invests in certain mutual funds even though one expects a lower 
rate of return compared to alternative investment opportunities. These are counter-
preferential choices if one assumes selfishness is the standard for economic choices.11 
The story becomes more complicated once attention is shifted to the producing firms, 
countries and traders that are subject to the value based consumer and investor 
choices. A shift in allocation of investment capital and consumer purchasing power 
due to altruistic decision-making is beneficial only to those companies, industries or 
countries that are favored by the social values. It is economically detrimental to those 
parties which are negatively discriminated against. Looking at macroeconomic conse-
quences, the loading of economic exchange relations with value orientations that are 
followed through altruistic decisions may be problematic as well. They might lead to a 
particularization of exchange which undermines competition. It contradicts the func-
tional differentiation of the economy, i.e., its detachment from substantial value con-
victions that makes economic exchange non-discriminatory and inclusive. If decisions 
are based on altruism, capital is not allocated exclusively under criteria of economic 
efficiency. Moreover, any judgment of altruism must consider that, given the complex 
interrelations within the economy, effects may be highly unspecific and contaminated 
by unintended consequences that may outweigh their positive intentions (Luhmann 
1993: 136). Boycotts may also hurt those actors whose interests shall be protected.12 
Altruism can have similar non-intended effects as the blockage of exchange does. 
                                                        
10 Despite these costs, it is debatable to what extent socially conscientious consumer behavior 
qualifies as altruism. Though its declared intention is the principle-based increase of the wel-
fare of others, this does not exclude the maximization of one’s own utility. This is the case if 
the well-being of alter ego forms part of the utility function of ego. This assumes, however, 
contrary to standard economic models, that utility functions are not independent. Following 
Amartya Sen (1977), such choices can nevertheless be characterized as moral behavior as long 
as the personal utility is not the reason for them.  
11 These value-oriented allocations of money can be integrated into an economic decision-
making model that demands only coherence of choices. 
12 Boycotts are morally ambivalent. They might be seen as positive by society if values are ex-
pressed that find widespread acceptance. The act of boycotting products from South Africa 
during the Apartheid regime found broad social support. But what if investment is directed to 
companies upon the condition that they avoid hiring foreigners or Jews? What about boycott-
ing Korean groceries in black neighborhoods of Los Angeles? For the moral evaluation of al-
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Trojan altruism 
A further way in which “morality” can enter markets I want to call “Trojan altruism.” 
This is not a type of moral behavior, but refers to the strategic use of substantial value 
orientations for one’s own benefit and at the cost of others. Trojan altruism is deceit-
ful. There are several examples that stand at least under suspicion to form cases of 
Trojan altruism. The first one is food aid to Third World countries. Food aid increases 
supply in local markets, causes the depreciation of prices and thereby drives local pro-
ducers out of the market. It can also contribute to a change in demand by influencing 
the taste of consumers and thereby decrease demand for local crops. The dependency 
created through the destruction of local agricultural production is at the same time 
beneficial to food exporting countries in the developed world. 
The suspicion of Trojan altruism also plays a role in current political discourse about 
standards of social and environmental accountability in global production systems. 
Codes of social accountability are increasingly honored in business transactions with 
Third World suppliers. Prison labor, child labor, sweatshop working conditions and 
pollution of the environment are prime issues. The definition of the codes of conduct 
takes place mostly in the North. This opens the possibility that the enforcement of a 
seemingly morality based standard – for instance the policy not to buy products made 
through the use of child labor – is in fact a hidden enforcement of a competitive dis-
advantage for Third World countries, implying additional hardship for the poor. In 
many countries, child labor is a crucial source of family income and low wages are one 
of the few competitive advantages of the economies of the South. The same argument 
can be made with regard to standards of environmental protection. To make this 
point more systematically: Altruism might reflect a paternalistic definition of interests 
of the South13 by people in the North that have little to do with the interests people of 
the South actually have. This suspicion of paternalistic definition of interests became 
an important dispute between NGOs from the North and the South in the anti-
globalization movement in recent years. 
Conclusion 
What can we learn from the proposed distinction of types of moral behavior in mar-
kets? The argument pursued in this paper was that the role of morality for market 
outcomes is deeply ambivalent. Market-liberal objections to any type of coordination 
                                                                                                                                                       
truism, the concrete values at stake must be considered. This presupposes a principle for the 
regulation of value conflicts. 
13 This is parallel to Lukes (1974) third face of power. 
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devices but self-interest don’t do justice to the problems emerging from unequal ini-
tial endowments, monopolistic market structures, external effects, free-riding and 
principal-agent problems. This, on the other hand, does not imply that morality based 
decision-making can be seen as unequivocally positive for the efficiency of market 
outcomes. Morality might be discriminatory to outsiders, hinder the functional dif-
ferentiation of the economy and block markets that would be beneficial for at least 
some market participants. 
These profound ambivalences disqualify all positions of unqualified rejection of mo-
rality as an action orientation of market participants. However, they also pinpoint to 
benefits of demoralization of market exchange. The typology introduced identifies 
different implications of morality for the efficiency of market outcomes for the differ-
ent types. Mostly positive effects can be attributed to cooperation, i.e., moral behavior 
in the context of problems associated with free-riding and principal-agent situations. 
In these situations, ethical codes are one mechanism by which market failure can be 
avoided and more efficient outcomes achieved. By contrast, exchange blockages ap-
pear profoundly ambiguous, as they represent values in a society. As an ideal type, 
their enforcement is independent from their consequences for personal utility and 
macroeconomic welfare effects. They can nevertheless contribute to economic well-
being, for instance by blocking the purchase of political decisions (corruption). They 
can, on the other hand, prevent the functional differentiation of the economy and 
might result in unintended consequences like the emergence of illegal markets. While 
it might be politically decided to reduce the scope of markets by legally blocking the 
exchange of certain goods and services, these non-intended consequences must be 
reflected in any consequentialist moral judgment of such restrictions. Altruism trans-
ports substantial value orientations into the realm of the economy as well. Its evalua-
tion depends on the values that are enacted but also on the unintended effects it 
causes. Altruism can give moral justification to redistributive policies and thereby 
help to integrate the issue of equity into a market economy. Group solidarity has am-
bivalent consequences too. It can lead to the cartelization of market exchange and it 
excludes outsiders. On the other hand, it can also help stabilize markets, reduce power 
differentials between different social groups and help to pool resources for invest-
ments that would otherwise be unobtainable. Finally, Trojan altruism is a parasitic use 
of morality that does not find moral legitimation. Its effects are clearly negative, based 
on the criterion of Pareto efficiency, since it aims at gaining advantages at the cost of 
the other side of the exchange. 
While the typology does not lead to unambiguous distinctions with regard to the wel-
fare effects of the four specific forms of commitment based behavior, it does provide 
insights into the specific problems which are characteristic for the different types. 
Moreover, it indicates that the moral embeddedness of the economy is not a dysfunc-
tional relic from premodern times but rather an integral part of the efficient function-
ing of markets. At the same time, the role of morality in the market cannot be reduced 
to its economic functions. The observation of inefficiencies due to moral orientations 
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of actors does not itself give justification to condemn these expressions of value ra-
tionality. Instead, they demonstrate that economies work within the context of a 
moral universe that itself cannot be reduced to criteria of economic efficiency. The 
ambivalence of morality for market outcomes is due to the fact that markets necessar-
ily operate within a social field in which economic and non-economic values merge. 
This can be beneficial to economic outcomes or inhibit economic efficiency. The 
theoretical insight emerging from the ambivalent role of morality on markets is that 
no economy will ever be “only economic” even if this inhibits some of its economic 
functions. 
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